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Abstract. This article analyses various e-threats that were expressed in media texts that 
focused on e-threat discourses concerning the Estonian identity card’s security risk in 
2017. The discourse of cyberthreats contains strong and controversial meanings because 
the peculiarities of cyberspace remain intangible for average readers who do not possess 
expert knowledge regarding ICT. The wider aim of the paper is to suggest how the 
topic of e-threats could be given public coverage without fuelling irrational anxiety and 
unwarranted threat scenarios. Our theoretical basis combines the frameworks of the 
Copenhagen School of security studies and ideas of cultural semiotics. We explain the 
semiotic logic of phobophobia (i.e. the abstract concern with the devastating impacts of 
the collective feeling of fear) and the discourse of fear that is characterized by a significant 
reliance on analogies, drawing vague demarcation line between reference objects and the 
dominance of negative emotional tonality. Our study demonstrates that the main actors of 
threat and the consequences of the identity card’s security problems were associated with 
unknown hackers and the damaging of the reputation of Estonia as an e-state. 
Keywords: e-threats; cultural semiotics; phobophobia; securitization; security risk; 
semiotics of fear
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Introduction
The article focusses on the media coverage of the theoretical vulnerability of 
Estonian identity cards that was discovered in autumn 2017. The coverage painted 
the hitherto overwhelmingly positive image of the Estonian e-state in much 
darker colours and envisioned several imminent e-threats. Since the beginning 
of the 1990s, discourse on smart e-solutions in education, medicine and state 
government has become commonplace; many researchers have pointed out that 
the digital success story has become a cornerstone of the brand of Estonia as a 
nation (Jansen 2008; 2012; Kulcsár, Yum 2012: 198; Madisson 2016; Tammpuu, 
Masso 2018). In collaboration with marketing agencies, dozens of Estonia’s top 
politicians and experts – or, in other words, spokespersons of e-Estonia – have 
been systematically spreading and creating messages that promote Estonia’s 
image as a digital state, both for domestic and foreign audiences.1 This image 
of Estonia was perhaps one of the main reasons for the emergence of a heated 
public debate around the unsuccessful communication strategies deployed to 
inform the public about the identity card vulnerability. A common position taken 
was that the coverage of the vulnerability had created an irrational panic that, on 
the one hand, undermined citizens’ positive outlook on the e-state and, on the 
other hand, enabled hostile forces to keep detailed track of the vulnerabilities of 
Estonia’s digital infrastructure – and consequently, to undermine the Estonian 
state’s security and/or positive image. The discourse surrounding the vulnerability 
of the identity card provides semiotics with fascinating research material, since 
there is a collision of positive self-descriptions and expressions of several fears 
related to the digital state.
 One purpose of the article is to explicate the discourse of e-threats. An aspect 
of this discourse is phobophobia – fear of the fear itself, unleashed in society by 
the identity card vulnerability. Several academic works have pointed out that the 
object-level complexity and vague boundaries of information and communications 
technology (ICT) tend to get transferred to meta-level analyses (for example, to 
expert opinions). The latter, then, consider a general culture of fear accompanying 
the developments of information technology, without, however, explicating the 
culture’s specific elements and their interrelations (Sandywell 2006; Hansen, 
1 From 2017 onwards, such image design is being coordinated by the communication agency 
Callisto Group; a detailed description of their main messages and a list of spokespersons can be 
found in the document “e-Eesti rahvusvahelise maine edendamise ajakohastatud tegevuskava 
aastateks 2018–2019” [“Plan for the promotion of Estonia’s international reputation for 
the years 2018–2019”]; https://www.ria.ee/sites/default/fi les/content-editors/ITT/e-eesti_
rahvusvahelise_maine_edendamise_tegevuskava_2018-2019.pdf. 
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Nissenbaum 2009; Jarvis et al. 2016). Our article has two main aims. Firstly, 
it analyses media texts that explicitly refer to phobophobia, or in other words, 
express concerns over the sense of fear prevalent in society and its potential effects 
on the decision-making process of individuals. The second purpose is to articulate 
the semiotic mechanisms underlying the discourses of e-threats and fears.
 The first part of the article develops a theoretical framework, using the frame-
work of securitization developed by the Copenhagen School. These scholars 
of international relations underline the social aspects of security. According to 
the framework of securitization, constructing an e-threat is a discursive act that 
constitutes at least one referent object, envisioned as being under threat and thus 
in need of urgent protection (Hansen, Nissenbaum 2009: 1156; Barnard-Wills, 
Ashenden 2012: 114). The referent object can be a state or a nation, but it can also 
belong to the private sector, for example, banking or transport. The second part of 
the article presents a textual analysis detailing the ways of constructing e-threats 
in the media coverage of the security vulnerability of the Estonian identity card. 
The third part explains the semiotic mechanisms of phobophobia and discourse of 
fear; here, we mainly rely on Mihhail Lotman’s ideas on the semiotics of fear and 
Juri Lotman’s framework of discrete and non-discrete logic of signification.
 We analysed 40 articles published on Estonian news sites (Postimees.ee, Delfi.
ee, err.ee, Geenius.ee) from September 2017 to September 2018. Postimees.ee and 
Delfi.ee are the most viewed news sites in Estonia; err.ee is the official site of the 
Estonian National Broadcasting. Geenius.ee was included in the sample because 
the site largely concentrates on digital and electronic technology; furthermore, the 
articles published in Geenius.ee are often reported in major Estonian newspapers. 
All the analysed articles explicitly referred to the vulnerability of the identity card.
1. Phobophobia and the semiotics of fear
Contemporary risks are more and more related to cyberspace and ICTs: data 
security, hacking, defence of digital infrastructure, personal (smart) technology, 
biased strategic communication, and troubling phenomena of social media such as 
the viral dispersion of fake news and information overload. Perception of e-threats 
and especially of risks related to social media has become solidified after Donald 
Trump’s election victory and the Brexit vote; disinformation campaigns and echo 
chambers are constant talking points, a sense of anxiety prevails over algorithms’ 
potential negative effect in shaping public opinion. It is feared that people’s beliefs 
and opinions are algorithmically predictable and perhaps even formable by big 
data analysis programs (Harsin 2015). It is increasingly believed that those with 
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most power are those able to align their strategic messages with big data analysis – 
as was done, for example, by Cambridge Analytica.
 The atmosphere of fear accompanying a sense of ignorance and distrust is 
explainable by the concept of phobophobia, which has been studied by Mari-
Liis Madisson in the context of sociocultural meanings of contemporary ICTs. 
According to Madisson, the core of phobophobia – or in other words, a certain 
meta-level fear – lies in the concern with the dangerous effects of a collective 
sense of fear and helplessness. Phobophobia is based on the understanding that 
society has been gripped by a wave of fear that inhibits any capacity for rational 
analysis and renders people short-sighted and easily manipulable (Madisson 
2016: 19). In the context of an atmosphere of fear it is common for people to 
start searching for scapegoats and act based on instinct rather than reason. The 
possibility of the emergence of conspiracy theories is one of the fears arising from 
such a context. The presupposition that it is possible to exploit the chaotic sense 
of fear and anxiety affecting the masses is a crucial component of meta-level fears. 
Phobophobia is often supported by the apprehension that powerful positions will 
be seized by those who have managed to stay out of sight in ordinary democratic 
deliberation.
 Discussing discourses of fear, it is important to differentiate between fright and 
fear. The former signifies an immediate reaction to events that have already taken 
place, the latter, however, entails anticipation of future events and presupposes both 
the expectation of danger as well as interpretation of signs in a foreboding key (M. 
Lotman 2009a: 209). The temporal distance between experience and interpretation 
ensures a smooth run for mechanisms of signification (M. Lotman 2009a: 210). As 
opposed to fright, fear operates as a frame for interpreting everyday events. The 
American sociologist David Altheide (2002: 59) calls this aspect the ‘discourse of 
fear’ or ‘non-parallel fear’ in which fear has become dominant and been turned 
into a context influencing the interpretation of singular events and phenomena. 
The fear of such a fear that has overcome society has been termed phobophobia 
in this article. From a semiotic perspective, the discourse of fear manifests itself in 
the contingency and arbitrariness of threats and in their future-oriented nature; 
concrete threats are seldom expressed. The discourse of fear is characterized by 
vagueness and indeterminacy of reference. The atmosphere of fear itself is an 
important context for the risks articulated in phobophobic discourse.
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2. Discourse of e-threats and securitization
This article regards cyberthreats first and foremost as discursive phenomena. 
According to the Copenhagen School, securitization is a discursive act with a 
specific rhetorical structure and political effect, an act that represents referent 
objects as existentially threatened; consequently, a successful securitizer can 
persuade his or her audience to take measures unthinkable outside the emergency 
situation (Buzan et al. 1998: 5). In studying securitization, it is important to 
analyse when a discourse with a specific semiotic structure attains enough 
power to persuade the public to break the rules in a way previously considered 
unacceptable (Buzan et al. 1998: 25).
 Studying the discursive construction of cyberthreats does not amount to 
saying that these threats are insignificant or that they do not actually exist. We 
are interested in those processes through which something becomes publicly 
perceptible and acceptable as a cyberthreat. A strong reaction to certain threats 
(for example, strict control of internet use in the case of cyberterrorism) may 
bring about serious problems in other domains (limitation of free speech and mass 
surveillance). Risks and the accompanying threat scenarios are largely constructed 
through meanings that they have in specific contexts for researchers, stakeholders 
and interest groups (Grint 2010; Head, Alford 2015).
 The emergence of an atmosphere of fear plays a significant role in the 
construc tion of threat discourses. This atmosphere enables the public to interact 
emotionally with certain topics and thus to attract more attention in the media. 
Mediating fear presupposes determining the causes of fear. According to 
Mihhail Lotman it is important to recognize in the articulation of social fears 
that the semiosis of fear is oriented towards finding expressive signs suitable for 
communicating a subjective sense of fear. This is the reason why the significational 
mechanisms of fear are indeterminate and ambiguous by nature (M. Lotman 
2009b: 1239). This is exactly why it is important to analyse how a discourse of fear 
constructs relations between different referent objects and thus contributes to its 
coherence.
 Securitization occurs when objects under threat are constructed and different 
domains needing protection are weaved into a whole (Hansen, Nissenbaum 
2009: 1163). Hansen and Nissenbaum (2009: 1157) name three modalities of 
securitization: (1) everyday security practices that draw on everyday experien ces 
and securitize the latter through constructing possible scenarios; (2) technifica-
tion: the discourse of threat and possible solutions to problems are constituted 
as necessitating technical expert knowledge; and (3) hyper-securitization, the 
construction of large-scale instantaneous cascading disaster scenarios that 
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place a long list of grave threats into an immense chain – while none of those 
threat scenarios have taken place as yet. Although fear has a role to play in the 
construction of each modality, hyper-securitization is the most likely trigger 
of a discourse of fear and of constructing chains of indeterminate connections 
(Ventsel, Madisson 2018; Ventsel et al. 2019).
3. Analysis: Representation of e-threats in the media 
coverage of Estonian identity card vulnerability
The discussion dealing with the media coverage of the vulnerability of the Estonian 
identity card will, firstly, map the referent objects represented as being in need of 
protection. Secondly, we analyse four interrelated categories: representation of the 
social actors connected to e-threats and their activity–passivity; the articulation of 
the acuteness of e-threats; the construction of an emotional context for e-threats; 
and the description of potential counter-measures (to be) taken in order to 
solve the problems facing the referent objects. These categories are based on the 
observations of authors (van Leeuwen, Hansen, Nissenbaum, Bednarek, Caple) 
dealing with discourses of threat; the categories provide us with a systematic 
perspective on the analysed material. Let us start with a brief overview of the 
chronology of events.
3.1. Chronology of the case
At the beginning of September 2017, the Estonian public was notified that the 
almost 760 000 identity cards of the new type (that is, issued from October 
2014 until October 2017), produced by Gemalto, have been identified as having 
a theoretical vulnerability in their software. On 3 November, CERT-EE, an 
institution operating under  the Information System Authority [Riigi Infosüsteemi 
Amet, RIA], issued a warning of potential phishing e-mails. Such e-mails 
were associated with potential spreading of malware and identity theft.2 From 
the evening of 3 November, the Estonian government decided to suspend all 
certificates of identity cards with the vulnerability. The Police and Border Guard 
Board [Politsei- ja Piirivalveamet, PPA] offices were open, from 3 November to 
5 November, outside working hours in order to provide intensive users – those 
who actively use the PIN1 and PIN2 codes – with the possibility to update their 
certificates. During these three days, remote updating of certificates was disabled. 
2 Full text of the warning can be found here: 
https://twitter.com/CERT_EE/status/926475950883328000. 
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Priority was given to doctors, legal workers and employees of the Vital Statistics 
Department (Jõevere, Helme 2017). After 5 November, remote updating of 
certificates was restored until 31 March 31, 2018. It transpired, however, that 18 
000 people could not update their certificates remotely (Krjukov 2017). Extensive 
media coverage of the identity card vulnerability ensured a numerous turnout 
to the PPA offices of even those people who used identity cards’ electronic 
applications infrequently (Saar 2017). The end of November 2017 witnessed a 
marked media escalation of the topic. At that time, a dispute broke out between 
Gemalto and the PPA. Gemalto’s representatives claimed that they had notified 
the PPA of the vulnerability already in the summer and that the latter had simply 
covered it up until September (Pau 2017a).
3.2. Mapping referent objects
In the analysis of the threat discourses regarding the identity card vulnerability, 
we were able to delineate three principal domains of referent objects represented 
as directly threatened. The first domain was related to national security  – the 
suspension of identity cards’ certificates impeded information exchange between 
citizens and the state. These threats were not perceived as overly dangerous; it was 
stressed that any potential hacking and exploitation of personal data would be 
too time-consuming and expensive: it would require a separate hacking of each 
individual account.
In the future, any code is hackable; the question is, however, if and for whom is it 
is feasible to splash a million Euros in order to access a pensioner’s bank account 
or steal a vote from the Minister of Social Aff airs in order to support the Reform 
Party?3 [...] [H]acking of one card would cost 80,000 Euros. (Kund, Pau 2017)
The potential manipulation of e-voting was seen as the principal referent object 
in need of securitization. It was parliamentary politicians and not digital experts, 
who would argue that Estonian democracy would come under threat because 
of manipulations to free elections. This is the reason why this particular threat 
discourse should be viewed in the context of the political struggle accompanying 
the 2017 local elections which took place in October. A heated debate ensued 
among politicians over the security of e-voting; cancelling the e-vote was 
repeatedly put on the table for security reasons. The Conservative People’s Party 
of Estonia (Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond, EKRE) and the Estonian Centre 
3 In 2017, the Reform Party (then in the opposition) was critical of the rise in excise tax put 
on alcohol, a rise initiated by the Minister of Social Aff aris Jevgeni Ossinovski from the Social 
Democratic Party. 
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Party (Eesti Keskerakond) were the principal opponents of the e-vote; they had 
been sceptical of electronic voting even earlier. According to Mart Helme, the 
chairman of the EKRE faction in Riigikogu [Parliament], their party had come 
to the conclusion that the vulnerability of the identity card had created a risk of 
manipulation of votes and thus influencing election results. 
According to legal practice, it is enough that there exists a possibility of the 
violation of rights, any actual violation need not take place. In cancelling the 
e-vote, the probability of exploitation of the vulnerability does not matter, since it 
cannot be predicted by anyone. (Reisenbuk 2017) 
Jaanus Karilaid, Vice Chairman of the Centre Party, pointed to similar threats 
looming over the e-vote: “Democracy cannot have any vulnerabilities.” He then 
recommended that the election commission should, in coordination with experts, 
seriously consider whether it is appropriate to go forward with the e-vote in light 
of the vulnerability. “The Centre Party has always stressed that e-voting should be 
secure and transparent,” said Karilaid (Kund, Pau 2017).
 Parties previously favourably disposed towards e-voting – the Estonian Reform 
Party [Eesti Reformierakond] and the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union [Isamaa 
ja Res Publica Liit, IRL]4  – did not change their position and expressed their 
support for the e-vote even after the disclosure of the vulnerability. “It is low to 
connect this [vulnerability of Estonian ID-card] to the general debate over the 
reliability of e-voting, as does Mart Helme, using a spiteful rhetoric in hindsight,” 
said Urmas Reinsalu, the Minister of the Interior from the IRL (Olup 2017). 
Politicians’ statements were largely characterized either by accusing the opponents 
in escalating fears or by connecting the identity card vulnerability with the other 
(Centre and Conservative People’s) parties’ previous condemnatory positions 
towards e-voting that were legitimized by the current situation.
The second domain of referent objects was the private sector. Here, the main 
theme was the potential disturbance in banking and electronic trade. In a flash 
interview to Postimees, Tanel Tammet, Professor of the School of Information 
Technologies at the Tallinn University of Technology, said: “I would personally say 
that e-commerce and, because of this, internet banking, are the main reasons for 
the large-scale use of electronic identity in Estonia” (Pau 2017b).
A much more forceful discourse of threat was articulated in relation to the third 
domain, damage to the Estonian e-state’s international reputation. Foreign media 
paid a significant attention to security problems facing the Estonian identity card; 
renowned publications such as the Financial Times and the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
4 Starting from June 2018, the party has been named Pro Patria [Isamaa].
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painted a rather dark picture of the theoretical security problems. Lauri Hussar, 
the editor-in-chief of the Postimees daily at the time, summarized this as follows: 
“In principle, we can say that the reputation of the Estonian e-state is put in 
question and the journalists over-suspicious of the cyber world can now gloatingly 
state that our success story will become the flight of the Phoenix” (Hussar 2017). 
The identity card blunder was also covered by the British technology news site 
The Register that had dug up an Estonian expletive for their title: “Kurat võtku!” 
[“Damn it!”] (Piir 2017).
According to the journalists of the Postimees, several analysts of the security 
of information technology found that the sole credible threat emerging from 
the vulnerability was reputation damage: “If somebody really wanted to take 
advantage of the vulnerability, resources would most likely be spent on ruining 
Estonia’s reputation” (Kund, Pau 2017).
3.3. Active and passive social actors 
Having first delineated the principal referent objects under threat, we can now 
use them to analyse the distribution of active and passive social roles. According 
to Theo van Leeuwen (2008: 33), active actors are represented as dominating and 
shaping a certain domain or action. Those in a passive role are, to the contrary, 
represented as the recipients and perceivers of a certain event. Regarding e-threats, 
it is telling how the roles of the threatener and the threatened are expressed. As 
mentioned above, the complexity of information technologies often makes it 
difficult to identify the dominating and controlling actors.
 The producer of cards, Gemalto, and their customer, the PPA were among 
the first to articulate risk scenarios regarding the identity card. Both attempted 
to locate the cause of the crisis in the other’s activity. When the vulnerability 
was picked up by the media, Gemalto almost immediately launched a counter-
communications operation that laid the principal blame on the PPA. Andreas 
Lehmann, representative of Gemalto Eesti and the CEO of Trüb Baltic AS, 
commented on the social network LinkedIn on a post made by Andres Kütt, 
the former chief architect of the e-state for the RIA. Lehmann claimed that he 
had notified Estonian authorities (i.e. PPA and RIA) of the vulnerabilty on 15 
June 2017, and that the main reason why Estonia had remained passive and 
not taken measures to relieve the threats was the summer vacation enjoyed by 
the authorities (Tamm 2017). The official position of the Estonian state denied 
Lehmann’s statement. “The PPA received information of the identity card chip 
vulnerability from the RIA on 31 August,” stated Martin Luige, spokesperson of 
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the PPA (Gavronski 2017). Claims made by Lehmann did, in fact, turn out to be 
unverifiable later; Lehmann was transferred to a different position. The mutual 
accusations made by Gemalto and the PPA should be viewed in the context of 
the process of negotiating a solution for the compensation of damages, a process 
that aimed to identify the main culprit for the crisis (Lõugas 2018a). This is the 
reason why, based on the speaker’s position, the other side was depicted either as 
the source of the problem or else as a victim suffering because of it.
 The second actor represented in the discourse of Estonian identity card 
vulnerability was Russia. Mart Helme pointed at the Russian special services – 
more precisely, at the Foreign Intelligence Service – and their interest in Estonian 
elections. “Let us recall that Russia has also been previously accused of interfering 
with elections in France, Germany, Great Britain, and the USA. Now the time has 
come for Estonia,” Helme said (Kund, Pau 2017). Regarding Helme’s comment, it 
is important to underline that Russia was not understood to have been the cause 
of the problem, but a possible beneficiary and abuser of the vulnerability; in other 
words, Russia was represented as an active participant in magnifying e-threats.
 This accusation made towards Russia should, again, be interpreted in the context 
of the 2017 local elections for no one named Russia as an active agent besides 
politicians – for whom the Russian threat is an important rhetorical tool to be used 
in scare tactics. Helme was soon countered by the EKRE’s principal ideological 
opponent, the Social Democratic Party [Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond, SDE]. 
Hannes Hanso, the former Minister of Defence for the SDE, claimed that Russian 
hacking of Estonian e-voting system was highly unlikely (Velsker 2017). The possible 
experiences of threat for Russia’s potential victims were, however, not elaborated on; 
nor were the potential consequences of Russian manipulation of e-voting specified: 
whether the interference would have had promotion of a specific political force or 
damaging the Estonian e-state’s reputation more generally as its aim.
 The third type of actors represented in the media were hackers. “From the 
moment when the work of the Czechs5 was disclosed and when it became clear 
that the deficiency was, in addition, caused by Slovaks, Spaniards, Germans, and 
the services of Microsoft and Google, international attention grew to a point 
where those type of people emerged whose interest it is to pry open our cards,” 
said the CEO of CERT-EE Klaid Mägi. It was considered theoretically possible for 
hackers to create a digital clone of an Estonian resident and pose as him/her in the 
internet – providing that the hackers possessed enough financing, of course. Mark 
Erlich, technology consultant at the RIA, described this as follows:
5 Th e theoretical security risk was discovered by a group of researchers led by the Czech Petr 
Svenda. 
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If someone could clone a digital ID, he could theoretically use the identity card for 
personal identifi cation and for signing documents digitally without possessing a 
card him or herself and without knowing the PIN codes.(Kund, Pau 2017)
The discourse on hackers did not determine, however, how the hackers would 
actively be using the digital clone and what the security threats would be like for 
groups under specific attacks. Possible threats to banking (for example, stealing 
people’s bank accounts) and disturbances in communication between the e-state 
and e-citizens were, to be sure, pointed out, but, as said above when mapping out 
referent objects, these actions were regarded as unlikely because of their expense 
and technical complexity. The identity of the hackers was left indeterminate; 
references were made to ‘those types’ and ‘crooks’, the opposition of the ‘good 
hackers’ (‘scientists’) and the ‘bad hackers’ (‘cyber criminals’) was used – naming 
strategies common when referring to actors operating in secrecy.
 The fourth group of actors were the public relations specialists of the Estonian 
Government. Serious deficiencies were spotted in their work, especially in 
their actions in informing the public of the identity card vulnerability and 
the accompanying risks. Many were of the opinion that the public relations 
department did not so much inform the public than exploit the crisis in the pre-
election struggle. Lauri Hussar, for example, said:
Upon closer inspection, we must, unfortunately, admit that we ourselves have 
been the greatest threat to the reputation of our e-state. If only the theoretical 
vulnerability had been addressed diff erently, not involving the Prime Minister and 
the politicians, coverage of the topic would have been far more moderate. (Hussar 
2017) 
Hanno Pevkur, former Chairman of the Reform Party, shared the opinion. He 
pointed at the pre-election struggle as a principal cause of damage done to our 
reputation: “When we talk of the reliability of e-services and the reputation of 
the Estonian state, then this is no place to be scoring political points” (Kund, Pau 
2017). Also Aivar Pau, a journalist at the Postimees pointed to the reprehensible 
connections between the escalation of e-threats regarding the identity card 
vulnerability and the upcoming elections: “The PR show served only one purpose: 
the desire of Jüri Ratas to discredit the e-vote” (Pau 2017c). The journalist also 
accused the public relations specialists of “sowing panic”. Instead of informing 
the public of potential e-risks, the opposite result was achieved: “This is the first 
case in Estonia in which a crisis is generated by the crisis communication itself6” 
6 Pau is referring to a press conference organized on 5 September 2017, by the government, 
the PPA and the RIA in order to inform the public about the security risks of the ID-card.
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(Pau 2017d; see also Kiin 2017). Pau also brought out the potential target groups 
for the government’s crisis communication: “vulnerability abusers and the people” 
(Pau 2017d).
 Thus, the public relations department of the Prime Minister’s office was 
represented as a primary actor exploiting the topic of identity card vulnerability 
in order to amplify the media coverage of the Prime Minister and of the politicians 
sitting in the parliament, and in order to put certain political themes (opposition 
to e-voting) on the media agenda. The public as a whole was represented as the 
primary “victim”, needlessly and excessively scared.
 Both Liisa Oviir (SDE) (Oviir 2017), the former Minister of Entrepreneurship 
and Information Technology and a Member of the Riigikogu, as well as Toomas 
Hendrik Ilves (Beltadze 2017), the former President of Estonia, opposed the 
discourse, accusing the Estonian government of sowing fear and hysteria and 
saying that informing the public of a potential identity card vulnerability was a 
natural practice in a democratic state. Oviir and Ilves did not regard it as a bad 
practice that the Prime Minister took on the task of informing the public about 
potential risks. According to them, it would have been dangerous coming from 
any other source, as then a potential cover-up by the government would have been 
added to the list of problems.
 Media emerged as another actor. The main critique addressed at journalists 
was their incompetence in covering the complex topic of information technology. 
Toomas Hendrik Ilves pointed out that the problems of Estonian e-solutions 
are technically complex and complicated, which is why talking about them and 
delving into them “requires both time and technical nous. As the articles in the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine and the Financial Times showed, many are not up to the 
task” (Beltadze 2017). In addition to the complexity of digital technologies, the 
clickbait logic of media economy, corrupting journalists’ work ethic, was pointed 
out as an amplifier of the threat discourse and a source of incompetence:
Superfi cial treatments are always a journalistic risk in the case of complex topics. 
One does not go deep enough, does not bother to engage properly. In case of this 
type of stories, I fi nd myself thinking that the press does not always realize the 
responsibility that comes with writing. It is not an intentional lie, but carelessness 
and clickbait attraction. (Beltadze 2017)
Journalists were thus represented as the amplifiers of the crisis, and not as the 
generators of it. The superficiality and inadequacy of media coverage was seen as 
a result of structural changes in the journalist profession (shorter articles, catchy 
and often more negative interpretations of topics, the need to gain clicks, etc.). 
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3.4. Articulation of the urgency of threats
An important aspect in representing e-threats is the expression of their urgency, 
or, in other words, the way they are depicted as in need of a fast and forceful 
reaction. This in turn presupposes the outlining of terrifying future scenarios 
which illustrate the realization of threats (Hansen, Nissenbaum 2009: 1164). 
Another significant rhetorical device in representing the potential consequences 
of cyberthreats is the construction of analogies with tragic historical events, for 
example, to 9/11, Pearl Harbor, or natural disasters (Jarvis et al. 2016: 620).
 The dominant rhetorical device in representations of the urgency of threats to 
national security and reputation damage was to imagine terrifying future scenarios. 
As already noted above, because of the identity card scandal politicians from the 
EKRE questioned the security of e-voting in general. A leading politician of the 
party Martin Helme claimed that there was an increase in the gravity of the threat 
because of its extensive coverage in the media. Justifying the necessity to cancel 
the e-vote, he noted: “It is a fact that no one can guarantee that manipulations 
won’t take place, especially now that information regarding the vulnerability and 
its causes has spread all over the world” (Reisenbuk 2017). Thus Helme essentially 
stated that IT experts cannot possibly solve the problem, which is why it would 
be necessary to cancel the e-vote in order to guarantee security. The article 
addressed the attacks in a rather abstract manner, without specifying either the 
potential details of their execution or any concrete aggressors. A similar line of 
thought, namely that extensive media coverage has turned the vulnerability into 
an attractive target for attacks, was also repeated by other authors. The journalist 
Aivar Pau (2017d) stated, for example, that “if, by any chance, there previously 
existed a crook ignorant of the vulnerability, then now they would definitely have 
at their disposal all the information necessary for hacking.”
 The emerging threats related to the identity card were represented as if needing 
an extremely quick reaction – potential attacks were foreseen as occurring in just 
a couple of days into the future. Thus, the Postimees reported on the position of a 
civil servants:
Th e time allotted to us is coming to an end as our information systems constantly 
keep crashing. Th e time for updating will run out very shortly. Th e threat 
assessment, or the black scenario, goes as follows: an attack directed at the security 
system of the Estonian identity card chip will occur on Friday or Saturday at the 
latest. (Pau, Berendson 2017)
This statement clearly expresses both recognition of signs of threat (constantly 
failing information systems) and the imminent actualization of risks. Underlining 
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the great probability of attacks taking place, one article stated: “The target is 
extremely attractive for attacking. Furthermore, it is more likely that hackers 
will attack in the next 48 hours than that they will not” (Pau, Berendson 2017). 
When speaking of e-threats, journalists reporting the positions of government 
officials used a hyper-securitizing style  – they envisioned extensive and 
imminently escalating risks with indeterminate reference. The article in question 
was dramatically entitled: “The ID-scare promises to turn into a catastrophe”, 
characterizing the gravity and future-oriented nature of the threats. The referent 
objects were represented as diffuse and omnipresent; for example:
While a couple of months ago, at the time of the publication of the news story 
coined as the e-scare, the potential target was only the vulnerability of the 
Estonian identity card chip, now the risk assessment is already global. It entails 
large corporations and other countries using a similar chip technology. (Pau, 
Berendson 2017)
The claim was related to the information revealed meanwhile, which implicated 
also the e-services of Microsoft and Google, as well as Slovakia, Spain and 
Germany that had also collaborated with Gemalto.
 Damage to the reputation of the Estonian e-state was also talked about as an 
extremely extensive problem, and yet one that would only materialize in the future. 
The closing lines of Lauri Hussar’s opinion piece exemplify this kind of attitude: 
“Damage to Estonia’s reputation has already been done and the opportunity to 
remedy the situation even a little will present itself at the end of the month at 
the European Union summit on digital technology. What is at stake is nothing 
more or less than the reputation of the Estonian e-state” (Hussar 2017). The media 
often repeated the idea that the identity card vulnerability puts Estonia’s image 
as a leader in digital technology at risk. On the one hand, it was stressed that 
the trustworthiness of Estonia’s e-systems could be set in doubt. On the other 
hand, it was even argued that the security risk might jeopardize our innovative 
e-infrastructure which might then be replaced with something primitive or 
backward-looking. In order to refer to such negative developments, the phrase 
“from the progress of an e-state, back to the stone age” (Pau, Berendson 2017) was 
used.
 To highlight the gravity of the threat, previous disasters that had shocked 
Estonia were referenced. In an opinion piece, the technology journalist Hendrik 
Roonemaa used a figurative comparison: “The storm of the century is raging 
around the Estonian e-state. [...] During an emergency situation it is wise not to 
stick your nose out and just accept it instead – unless this is urgently required” 
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(Roonemaa 2017). The comparison is probably with the January storm that hit 
Western Estonia in 2005, causing extensive flooding in the seaside towns of Pärnu 
and Haapsalu.
 Some statements also pointed at the disproportionate stress on security threats 
related to the vulnerability in specific parties’ communication strategies. Aivar Pau 
(2017c), for example, posed an intriguing rhetorical question: “I am definitely not 
a follower of conspiracy theories, but our e-vote and especially the identity card 
experienced the biggest blow to their reputation in history yesterday. My conspiracy-
theory-flavoured question is: which party gains the most?”
3.5. Constitution of the emotional background to the threats 
Connecting events and their potential consequences to the speakers’ condemning 
judgments and reactions expressing fear provides the events with a tone of 
emotion. Charging utterances with negative emotions makes it possible to 
attract the public’s attention and to intensify the sense of fear. This strategy is 
present, for example, in expressions of concern or in condemnations of certain 
developments, in the use of value judgments (e.g., ‘terrible’, ‘dreadful’, ‘dangerous’) 
or of vocabulary with negative connotations ( e.g., ‘problem’, ‘conflict’, ‘damage’) 
(Bednarek, Caple 2017: 79).
 More than a half of all the media reports on the identity card vulnerability 
contained condemning or fearful judgments of the events. “A high-ranking 
civil servant who has been dealing with the identity card vulnerability for the 
last couple of days, told the Postimees yesterday, ‘The situation is terrible’” (Pau, 
Berendson 2017). When speaking of the vulnerability, a range of negatively 
charged words were used to refer to the events of autumn 2017: ‘crisis’, ‘(security) 
risk’, ‘threat’. In articles speaking of the threat to Estonia’s digital infrastructure 
or to e-voting, there occurred a lot of talk of potential ‘attacks’ and of the 
‘vulnerability’ of systems. References to the clearly negative term ‘manipulation’ 
were quite common. Manipulation was most often mentioned regarding both the 
potential tampering with the e-vote and the disproportionate scaring of the public 
with threats accompanying e-voting.
 Media coverage that dealt with reputation damages to e-Estonia also used 
the term ‘vulnerability scandal’ to refer to the event. This term indicates that the 
vulnerability had been turned into a sensational media event. A similar tone was 
conveyed by the phrases ‘PR show’ and ‘crisis generated by crisis communication’. 
The phrase ‘damage to reputation’ and the verb ‘blemish’ that refers to malicious 
infringement were used quite often. To characterize the public’s reactions and 
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the media coverage itself, condemnatory terms or even ones referring to psycho-
pathology were used such as ‘panic’ and ‘hysteria’. Henrik Roonemaa (2017) used 
the metaphors of ‘panic’ and ‘hysteria’ forcefully in his opinion piece: “In the phase 
of hysteria, the dust from the tumult has not yet settled, so that nothing can be 
seen clearly. [...] There is no point, in this type of a situation, in waving your hands 
in the dust and panicing. After some time has passed, everything will become 
much clearer.” The wording expressed the author’s critical attitude towards the 
media’s overreaction as well as towards the excessive anxiety displayed by the 
people.
3.6. Ways of managing threats 
A key statement in the discourse of digital securitization is: if certain measures 
are not taken, grave events will occur in the near future (Hansen, Nissenbaum 
2009: 1161). Thus, at least some solutions are suggested in a discourse of threats, 
even if only implicitly. Because of the technical complexity of e-threats, public 
discourse tends to associate facing and fighting them with a relatively small group 
of experts possessing knowledge of the field (Hansen, Nissenbaum 2009: 1167). 
Informing the public of countermeasures to e-threats is thus a crucial component 
in a discourse of fear.
 In the discourse of Estonian identity card vulnerability, the following aspects 
were mentioned: (a) technical countermeasures taken in order to prevent attacks 
to identity cards with the vulnerability, and (b) structural countermeasures either 
taken or planned to be developed should similar digital problems occur in the 
future.
 The former, technical category involves, first and foremost, restrictions on the 
use of identity cards, applied in fear of potential hacking. On 5 September, the 
day that the media first reported the problem, the PPA suspended the public keys 
database. The keys enabled encryption and decryption of files – only the owner 
of the key can decrypt a file sent to him or her. The other significant measure was 
taken at the beginning of November. All identity cards with the vulnerability were 
suspended, because issuing new cards did not go according to plan and experts 
feared a hacking attack (Pau, Berendson 2017). The production of an updated 
version of the identity card, issued in 2018, also counts as a countermeasure 
(Lõugas 2018b). Some domains of the private sector were also involved in 
organized countermeasures. The RIA advised that citizens adopt mobile identity 
(Velsker 2017) and, after the disclosure of the identity card vulnerability, the 
Estonian mobile service providers were prepared for an increase in demand 
(Postimees 2017).
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 Legitimization of the above-mentioned countermeasures occurred in the 
context of a threat discourse on hacking and digital cloning. The countermeasures 
were supposed to diminish the (theoretical) threat even further. Our study did 
not find a single media report that would have mentioned a successful hacking of 
identity cards with the vulnerability.
 The structural countermeasures regarding management had to do with gaining 
better control of the whole system and with prevention of potential future security 
problems. Taimar Peterkopf, the general manager of the RIA, said in an interview: 
If we wish to act as a role model and be among the leaders of digital states also in 
the future, then the politicians have to dedicate more resources and attention to 
the fi eld. For this purpose, we could appoint a separate minister. (Lõugas 2018c) 
In addition, it was pointed out that there were too few specialists knowledgeable in 
identity card security in the public sector. Introducing a report on the identity card 
security crisis, Rain Ottis, the Head of the Centre for Digital Forensics and Cyber 
Security at the Tallinn University of Technology, said that the crisis was largely 
survived thanks to the specialists working in the private sector: “Whether it is the 
private sector, the academic sector or the public sector – it is not possible to bring 
them all together under the same roof. However, there is nothing bad in having 
specialists in the private sector, given that they are available to the government 
during emergencies” (Piir 2018).
 Both of these countermeasures  – restructuring of the field dealing with 
cyber security and increasing the number of specialists in digital technology – 
were justified by the position and reputation of Estonia as a leading e-state. 
Potential e-threats inevitably accompany the structures of the Estonian e-state. 
Both the experts [see, e.g., an interview with Anto Veldre (Leivak 2017)] and the 
spokespersons of e-Estonia (e.g., Toomas Hendrik Ilves) highlighted that the cyber 
domain is constantly evolving and that this always involves a possibility of certain 
risks. “The security risks [accompanying the identity card] are inevitable. An 
actual cyberthreat is preventable” (Beltadze 2017). Andrus Ansip, Vice-President 
of the European Commission, said that at the moment, when e-state’s solutions 
were facing special scrutiny – since Estonia was holding the presidency of the 
Council of the European Union – “quick problem solving [could] demonstrate our 
strength” (Velsker 2017) and help compensate for the damage to our reputation in 
the international arena.
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4. The logic of relations between scenarios of security risks 
in the context of phobophobia
The following will explain the semiotic mechanism underlying the discourses 
of fear regarding the identity card vulnerability. We will concentrate on directly 
phobophobic positions expressing concern over the excessive fear gripping the 
public, and on explicating the characteristics that amplified the discourse of fear 
in articulations of threat scenarios.
4.1. Fear of fear
The first important characteristic of a phobophobic discourse is that those 
articulating this discourse position themselves outside a discourse of fear. We are 
thus dealing with the position of a bystander – one does not rise to the meta-
level by reflecting over his or her own fears, but by expressing concerns over a 
panicking and manipulable public.
 In the course of the analysis of the discourse of e-threats we were able to 
determine two instances which clearly expressed concern over the unjustified 
sowing of fear. The first of those dates back to the beginning of the crisis. It was 
a piece of criticism directed towards the Prime Minister and his office, accusing 
them of amplifying the topic and of connecting it to the local elections. Sirje Kiin, 
literary scholar and communications specialist, noted in an opinion piece (Kiin 
2017) that, although informing the public of the identity card vulnerability was 
entirely justified, it should have been done not by the Prime Minister, but by either 
the RIA, Estonia’s top IT experts, or by the minister of the field in question.
Did this type of top-level political attention-grabbing not damage the reputation 
of the Estonian state even more than one (although, granted, large-scale) identity 
card security threat  – that, furthermore, was not caused by an error made in 
Estonia, but by chips imported from elsewhere. (Kiin 2017)
A similar sentiment was expressed by Aivar Pau, journalist at the Postimees: 
“Sowing of panic up front was not justified in my opinion; it was disproportionate 
and damaging  – to Estonia, to our identity card and to the reliability of our 
e-voting” (Pau 2017d).
 The second wave of concern over the proliferation of fears emerged at 
the beginning of November. By then, the potential likelihood of hacking had 
significantly increased according to several cyber security specialists, and the 
Estonian government decided to suspend the use of identity cards with the 
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vulnerability in fear of the threat scenarios becoming reality. Analysing the media 
coverage of the vulnerability in an opinion piece entitled “Everything will soon 
be alright”, the technology journalist Hendrik Roonemaa wrote, “No doubt it is 
necessary to cover these kind of events critically, but hysteria is not justified, nor 
is it necessary to anybody” (Roonemaa 2017).
In the following, we will explicate the general meaning-making mechanism 
prevalent in the representation of e-threats and the discourse of fear.
4.2. The semiotic mechanisms of the discourse of threat
E-threats can be divided in two: (1) concrete (actual or possible – that is, located 
in the future); (2) abstract or reference-based that are articulated in a relatively 
ambiguous manner. The latter type is characteristic of the discourse of fear. As 
shown by their very name, concrete e-threats are relatively clear-cut and can be 
localized. The articulation of abstract threats, however, entails the constitution of 
extensive sources of threat (covering several domains of life); the omnipresence 
and difficulty of identification of these sources is underlined. In the formation of a 
discourse of fear, it is important to analyse which discursive mechanisms are used 
to speak of e-threats and how different actors, referent objects and threat scenarios 
are woven together in a whole.
 Semiotics of culture differentiates between two fundamental types of discursive 
relations: (1) approximate or non-discrete logic of signification based on similarity 
and analogy; (2) discrete or verbal logic based on the regularized connection of 
elements, for example, chronologically and according to relations of cause and 
effect or the part and the whole (J. Lotman 2002: 2646–2649). The discourse of 
fear is first and foremost characterized by non-discrete signification: relations 
between the causes and effects of threats, as well as the sense of fear stemming 
from the risk, are ambiguously articulated.
 In the texts analysed, the abstract nature of threats was mainly expressed by 
the indeterminateness of actors and by future threats that were defined relati-
vely vaguely. The texts described the boundaries of the referent objects of securi-
tization, the relations between them, and the actors behind threat scenarios in a 
vague manner. Thus, in order to refer to active actors, the texts used the terms 
‘evil hackers’ and ‘crooks’ whose potential actions (e.g., the possible use of digital 
clones) and motivations were left unspecified – which is why these actors proved 
to be almost impossible to identify. A similar construction of relations can be 
seen in the discourse concerning the interference in e-voting. While a dangerous 
activity – manipulating the process of e-voting – was concretely named, it was not 
specified how exactly it is possible to interfere in the voting process, who would 
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commit the interference, and whose interests the interference would have served 
in the local election. The Russian card played by the Conservative People’s Party of 
Estonia can be understood as a strategy attempting to influence the constituency 
with fear of Russia. It is remarkable that such a hypothetical threat with a relatively 
vague reference was linked to a larger cascade of threats, thus connecting the 
identity card vulnerability with something so fundamental as the subversion of 
the Estonian democratic social order.
 We also recognized a contrary, non-discrete logic of the discourse of threat, a 
logic that clearly identified the actor, but did not specify any concrete threat scenarios 
or domains needing securitization. Prime Minister Ratas and the government’s PR 
team were identified as the generators of e-threats; they were accused of sowing 
panic among the public and of damaging the international reputation of the e-state. 
The specific meaning of ‘reputation damage’ was, however, left unspecified. The 
word ‘reputation’ is rather ambiguous; any specific descriptions of what damage to 
reputation would entail and whose reputation it was that was damaged – or, what 
the concrete referent object was – never became clear. Characteristics of hyper-
securitization were present in the media coverage of reputation damage; the latter 
was constituted as an umbrella that gathered together different threatened referent 
objects. Reputation damage and unsuccessful communication became the meta-level 
generators of causality, i.e those operating outside specific discourses of threat. The 
extensive and intensive coverage of the event was pointed to as a factor increasing 
the probability of attack, since the coverage supposedly resulted in drawing the 
attention of both the hackers and forces hostile to Estonia to the identity card and 
Estonian digital infrastructure. At the same time, unsuccessful communication was 
represented as a factor undermining trust in Estonian digital infrastructure and 
Estonia’s image as an e-frontrunner both at the national and the international level. 
The latter was perceived as especially problematic, since this image is a cornerstone 
of Estonia’s positive and future-oriented national identity.
 One characteristic of the abstract threat discourse was the articulation of 
scenarios of e-threats based on analogy. The purpose here was to envision and 
exemplify both the high probability and the terrible consequences of potential 
attacks. Analogies were drawn with events from recent history (Russian inter-
ference in French, German, British and American general elections; “the storm of 
the century”). Hypothetical future scenarios that drew parallels between the tense 
present situation (shortcomings in updates to information systems) and threats 
soon to be actualized (large-scale attacks on citizens’ e-identity or on the Estonian 
digital infrastructure).
 Since an analogy describes one object via a metaphorical substitution with 
another, the addressee of the message is often tasked with creating his or her own 
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image of the relations between the elements referring to the referent object. The 
relations are often defined by a mere reference to analogy or by an act of naming – 
a clear example of non-discrete construction of relations, according to Juri Lotman 
(J. Lotman 1999: 51; Ventsel, Madisson 2017, see also Ventsel 2014, 2016; Selg, 
Ventsel 2010).
 Besides analogy, the characteristic discursive ambiguity of phobophobia was 
expressed in the description of countermeasures to be taken in order to defend 
the securitized referent objects. This description was often characterized by 
a sense of urgency concerning the problem. ‘Crisis’, ‘(security) risk’ and ‘panic’ 
were constituted, in public discourse, as labels for the event  – all referring to 
an urgent need to remedy the situation and to find quick solutions. In order to 
manage e-threats, however, relatively abstract and future-oriented instructions 
were presented. Taimar Peterkopf, the general manager of the RIA, was rather 
indeterminate in his description of the professional tasks of a proposed ID-
minister: the minister would “set an ambition and create a political demand 
for fast progress” (Lõugas 2018b). It is not clear what could be done better or 
differently in case of a possibly emerging crisis. But of course some very concrete 
measures were also taken to manage the identity card security risks (see Section 
3.6. “Ways of managing threats”).
5. Conclusion
The article discussed the formation of a discourse of fear that emerged in 
connection with the identity card vulnerability disclosed in September 2017. 
In order to delineate this discourse we mapped the main referent objects, the 
actors, the urgency of threat references, and the proposed solutions to deal with 
the threats. According to the analysis, the principal threats presented in media 
discourse were the potential manipulation of the results of e-voting, hacking into 
the state’s information systems, and the extensive reputation damage to the e-state. 
The latter was constituted as a centre bringing together different discourses of 
threat, since the probability of hacking was understood to be increasing because 
of the extensive coverage of the event. The excessive and disproportionate 
communication of risks stemming from the vulnerability was seen as a direct cause 
of the reputation damage. In the discourse, this communication was related to pre-
election political struggle, but also to not easily graspable nature of information 
technology. The discourse speaking of unsuccessful communication was largely 
conceptualized in terms of phobophobia – the expression of fear concerning the 
potential consequences of the proliferation of the threat discourse. At this point it 
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is important to note that reputation damage was the topic everybody was speaking 
about: IT experts, politicians, communications experts and journalists. Reputation 
damage was thus constituted as a hyper-securitized referent object. E-voting was 
the object of mainly political rhetoric, while potential threats of hacking were 
mostly addressed by specialists in the field.
 We explicated the semiotic logic underlying the formation of a discourse of 
fear. This logic is based on non-discrete signification. In summary, the latter is 
expressed by the indeterminate manner of defining the relations between the 
causes and effects of threats and by the ambiguous sketching of the sense of fear 
accompanying the risks. In the coverage of the identity card vulnerability, the non-
discrete formation of connections by the discourse of fear was manifested, in some 
texts, in the representation of actors that were rather vaguely articulated, and in 
other texts, in the indeterminateness of threat scenarios and domains in need of 
securitization.7
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Семиотика угроз: дискурсы уязвимости эстонского 
удостоверения личности
Статья анализирует отражение в эстонских СМИ различных дискуссий, вспыхнувших 
после обнаружения угрозы риска злоупотребления эстонским удостоверением лич-
ности в 2017 году. Дискурс о киберугрозах не очень понятен обычному читателю, 
не обладающему экспертными знаниями относительно функционирования и архи-
тектоники электронных услуг. Поэтому тексты, где рассматриваются киберугрозы, 
вы зы вают иррациональное беспокойство и создают необоснованные сценарии 
угроз. Наша теоретическая основа объединяет понятийный аппарат Копенгагенской 
школы исследований в области безопасности с идеями семиотики культуры. Мы 
объясняем семиотическую логику фобофобии (то есть абстрактную озабоченность 
разрушительными последствиями коллективного чувства страха) и семиотические 
механизмы дискурса страха. Этот дискурс страха характеризуется использованием 
аналогий, нечеткими гранями между разными объектами-референтами и преобла-
данием отрицательной эмоциональной тональности. Наше исследование показывает, 
что главными актантами в дискурсе об электронной безопасности удостоверения 
личности были представлены неизвестные хакеры и подрыв репутации Эстонии как 
электронного государства.
Ohusemiootika: Eesti ID-kaardi haavatuvuse diskursused
Artiklis analüüsitakse 2017. aasta sügisel avastatud Eesti ID-kaardi turvariskiga seotud 
e-ohtude meediakajastusi. Küberohud on ilma IKT-alaste eriteadmisteta üldsuse jaoks raskesti 
mõistetavad ja seetõttu sisaldavad nendest rääkivad tekstid rohkelt vastuolusid, oletuslikkust 
ning tugevat emotsionaalset laengut. Analüüsis lähtutakse Kopenhaageni koolkonna julge-
olekustamise raamistikust, mille kohaselt on e-ohu konstrueerimine diskursiivne akt, mis 
kehtestab vähemalt ühe referentobjekti, mida kujutatakse ohustatuna ning kiiret kaitset 
vaja vana. Uurimuse laiemaks eesmärgiks on selgitada, kuidas rääkida e-ohtudest viisil, mis 
ei tekitaks auditooriumis liigseid ohustsenaariume, ärevust või hirmu. Selgitame fobofoobia 
loogikat, mis väljendub abstraktses mures kollektiivse hirmutunde ohtlike mõjude pärast, 
ning hirmudiskursuse semiootilisi mehhanisme. Viimast iseloomustab tugev toetumine ana-
loogiatele, referentobjektide vaheliste piiride ähmasus ning negatiivne emotsionaalne tonaalsus. 
Meie uurimus näitab, et ID-kaardi turvariskiga seotud ohudiskursus kujutas peamiste toimi-
jatena tundmatuid häkkereid ning nägi ohustatuima ning tulevikus kõige enam probleeme 
tekitava referentobjektina Eesti kui e-riigi maine kahjustamist.
